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~SSERRORINTHEPENALTYPHASE 
OF A CAPITAL CASE: A DOCTRINE 
MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED 
Linda E. Carter• 
The trial of the capital case is over. The defendant was convicted 
of murder. In the penalty phase, the State proved the aggravating 
circumstance of a murder in the course of a robbery. The defense 
introduced mitigating evidence of the defendant's financial stress 
and devotion to his family. The defense was precluded, however, 
from presenting evidence of the defendant's good adjustment to life 
in prison. The jury concluded that aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating circumstances and the defendant was 
sentenced to death. On appeal, the court finds that it was constitu-
tional error to refuse to admit the defense's evidence of the good 
adjustment to prison.1 Should the death verdict be reversed, or 
was the unconstitutional failure to admit mitigating evidence 
merely harmless error? This Article addresses the issues that arise 
in transferring the harmless error doctrine, developed in the 
context of a typical criminal trial, to the unique decision in the 
penalty phase of a capital case. 
In the current climate of concern that capital cases are litigated 
for too many years, 2 the harmless error doctrine is increasingly 
• ProfeBSOr of Law, McGeorge School of Law. B.A. 197 4, University of Illinois; J .D. 1978, 
University of Utah. The author wishes to thank those who commented on this article, 
especially ProfeBSOrs Scott W. Howe, Barry Stem, John Sims, and Clark Kelso, and her 
research assistants, Jineen Cuddy and J im Cordes. 
1 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (holding that precluding defendant 
from presenting evidence of •good adjustment~ to life in jail was reversible error). Unless 
an error is considered reversible per se, the "harm• of an error is dependent on the facts of 
each individual case. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 51-89 (discussing 
relationship between harm and obtaining the correct result in a case). 
2 See, e.g., Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoaki, Public Policy uuoM from the Robert 
Alton Harris Ctue, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 295 (diBCUBsing the California case of Robert Alton 
Harris, who was convicted in 1978 and executed in 1992). The delay in the Harris case 
generated considerable criticism. I d . at 298. The Attorney General of California referred 
to appellate and habeas proceedings as -Jegal maneuverings. • I d. But see Charles M. Sevilla 
& Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The Death Penalty 
Ctue of Robert Alton Harris, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 345 (1992). The authors, who represented 
125 
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applied to speed the process to a conclusion. In the haste to apply 
the doctrine in the penalty phase of a capital case, the rationale for 
the doctrine is being ignored. The use of a harmless error analysis 
is premised on an ability to determine the effect of the error on the 
decision rendered. 3 The effect of an error on the penalty phase 
decision, which usually requires a weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, 4 is significantly more difficult to assess than is 
the effect of an error on the decision that a particular element of a 
crime exists. 
The application of the harmless error doctrine to the penalty 
phase of capital cases is probably a natural extension of the trend 
by the courts to subject an increasing number of errors to a 
harmless error analysis. 5 By viewing the application of the 
harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase as completely 
analogous to harmless error in the guilt phase, however, courts 
have failed to analyze adequately the rationale of the doctrine. 
This Article addresses the applicability of the harmless error 
doctrine to constitutional errors raised on direct review in the 
penalty phase of capital cases. 6 The first section sets forth the 
history of applying the harmless error doctrine to constitutional 
error, as developed by the United States Supreme Court. The 
Harris on death row, explain the reasons for the court proceedings and note that substantive 
challenges, such as the lac:lt of mitigating medical testimony at the original trial, were 
legitimately raised through habeas proc:eedings. ld. 
1 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 29-37 (di8CUIIsing recent Supreme Court decisions on the harmleu error doctrine). 
• See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985) (stating that trier of fact must decide 
if "aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances•); .e also statutes cited 
infra note 100. 
'See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizons v. Fulminante: TM Harm of Applying Hannku 
Error to Coeroed Confeuioru~, 105 HARV. L. REv. 152, 159 (1991) ("Since Chapman, the 
Supreme Court has expanded the power of courts to find harmless constitutional error. •); 
Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Ho.rmku Coru~titutional Error, 88 COL. L. REv. 79, 
79-80 (1988) (referring to "the [Supreme Court's] increasingly widespread use of the doctrine 
of harmlellB constitutional error-). 
1 The Supreme Court bas recently held that a Ieeser harmless error standard will apply 
to constitutional error raised in federal habeas proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. 
Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993). For a diiiCUIIBion of this case, see infra notee27-28 and accompanying 
text. This article spec:ific:ally addressee the standard developed through cases on direct 
review. However, the basic: concern of this Artic:le, that the value-baaed decision in the 
penalty phase must be considered in deciding harmleu error iuues, is applicable to either 
standard. 
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second section discusses two ml\ior interpretational issues that 
plague harmless error analysis: (1) the meaning of the terminology 
that an error does not "contribute" to a verdict; and (2) when an 
error should be treated as per se reversible rather than subject to 
harmless error analysis. 
The third section focuses on the applicability of the harmless 
error analysis to the penalty phase. This section is subdivided into 
three parts. The first subsection identifies the critical characteris-
tics of the penalty phase proceeding. The second subsection 
questions the applicability of the harmless error doctrine to error 
in the penalty phase. Particular attention is given to the nature of 
the penalty decision and the rationale of the doctrine. The third 
subsection critiques the method of assessing the harm in the 
penalty phase. 
Ultimately, the Article suggests that the value of the harmless 
error doctrine to the criminal justice system will be preserved if 
courts recognize that the value-based decision in the penalty phase 
stands in stark contrast to the fact-based decision in the "guilt 
phase" or trial. The difference in the nature of the decision 
rendered in the penalty phase merits consideration by the courts in 
assessing both the applicability of the doctrine and, if applicable, 
the harm of an error. 
I. THE DEVEWPMENT OF THE HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD 
Harmless error as a concept originated as a measure to lessen 
the impact of the Exchequer Rule. 7 The Exchequer Rule resulted 
in reversal for almost all error in trials. 8 In response, Parliament 
enacted a law in 1873 that set forth a standard for assessing 
harmless error. Error was reversible only if there was "some 
substantial wrong or miscarriage. m~ 
In the United States, a harmless error doctrine began to emerge 
in the 1900s through statutory enactments on both the federal and 
7 RoGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 6 (1970); Steven H . Goldberg, 
Harmku Error: CoMtitutional Snea4 Thkf, 71 J . CRIM. L. & CRIM. 421, 422 (1980). 
8 TRAYNOR,11upra note 7, at 8; Goldberg, 11upra note 7, at 422; Philip J. Mause, Harmku 
CoMtitutional Error: The lmplicatioM of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 
(1969). 
• TRAYNOR, 11upra note 7, at 8-9; Goldberg,11upra note 7, at 422. 
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state levels. 10 The statutes spoke in the familiar language of 
"affecting the substantial right of a party"11 and "miscarriage of 
justice. "12 
Federal constitutional error was not analyzed as harmless until 
the 1960s. In Fahy v. Connecticut, 13 four Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court indicated that Fourth Amendment error 
should be subjected to a harmless error analysis.14 Subsequently, 
in Chapman v. California, 16 the Court subjected a Fifth Amend-
ment error to a harmless error analysis. 18 
Chapman is significant both for the standard that was promul-
gated by the Court for assessing harmless error and for the 
understanding of the standard which may be gleaned from the 
result reached in that case. The Fifth Amendment error in 
Chapman was glaring. The prosecutor argued inferences to the 
jury that could be drawn from the defendants' silence, and the trial 
court instructed the jury that they could use the defendants' silence 
against them. 17 According to the Supreme Court, a harmless error 
analysis meant assessing " 'whether there is a reasonable possibili-
10 TRAYNOR, supra note 7, at 14; Goldberg, supra note 7, at 422. 
11 See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 7, at 15 (describing federal statute's language that errors 
are harmleas if they do not " 'affect the substantial rights of the parties' •). 
11 See, e.g., C. Elliot Keasler, Death and Harmle118MBB: Application of the HarmleBB Error 
Rule by the Bird and Luccu Courl8 in Death Penalty Ca~es-A Comparison & Critique, 26 
U.S.F. L. REv. 41,46 (1991) (describing California's "miscarriage of justice• harmleas error 
standard). 
IS 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
14 The mlljority held that erroneous admission of illegally seized evidence was prejudicial, 
and thus could not be called harmleaa error. ld. at 91-92. While the mlljority sidestepped 
the iasue whether Fourth Amendment violations can ever be subject to harmless error 
analysis, the four diaaenters urged that the hannleas error standard should be applied here: 
whether the unconstitutional evidence could have changed the outcome of the trial. I d. at 
95. 
II 386 u.s. 18 (1967). 
11 Id. at 21-22. 
17 The prosecutor "took full advantage of his right under the State Constitution to 
comment upon [defendants'] failure to testify, fllling his argument to the jury from beginning 
to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of their guilt resulting 
therefrom: ld. at 19. 
The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant in a criminal trial may not be 
compelled to testify. The jury may also take the defendant's failure to deny or explain 
evidence, which he could reasonably be expected to deny or explain, aa tending to indicate 
the truth of the evidence and that the more unfavorable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are the more probable. Id. at 19 n.2. 
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ty that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction.' "18 The Court viewed this analysis as synonymous 
with a determination that "the error did not contribute to the 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."19 The standard, thus defined 
in Chapman, is also often cited as whether the error is '1larmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. "20 
The Court in Chapman concluded that the error of commenting 
on the defendants' silence was not harmless. 21 Despite the fact 
that there was properly admitted evidence to support the ver-
dict, 22 the Court found that the jurors were likely to have given 
significant weight to the impermissible inferences from the 
defendants' silence. 23 The emphasis on the inference of guilt from 
the defendants' silence was apparent from the number and 
intensity of references to the silence.24 AB a consequence, the 
Court felt that "honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have 
brought in not-guilty verdicts. "26 Thus, the Court focused on the 
impact of the erroneously admitted evidence on the minds of jurors 
in reaching a decision and did not particularly address the strength 
of the properly admitted evidence. This seminal use of the 
harmless error doctrine stands as an example of how to assess 
whether an error contributed to the verdict. 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has defined and refined 
the parameters of the Chapman harmless error doctrine. 26 In a 
18 Id. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). 
•• Id. at 24. 
'JI)ld. 
21 Jd. 
zz I d. at 25 (M[T)he case • • • presented a reasonably strong 'circumstantial web of evidence' 
against petitioners."). 
'AJd. 
14 ld. at 19. 
11 ld. at 26. 
• The harmleaa error doctrine diec:ussed in this Article is limited to situations where the 
doctrine is applied after the error ia found to exist. Thus, if there ia error because a 
confession was coerced in violation of the Constitution, the issue is whether the error was 
harmless. There are some constitutional errors, however, that incorporate a harmleBSness 
standard into the definition of the error itself. For instance, in order to find ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the performance of an attorney in violation of the Sixth Amendment, 
there must be action by the attorney that does not fall within a range of"reasonably effective 
888istance," and the action must result in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If there is no prejudice, there is no error. This is a 
different situation conceptually from assessing the harmleBSness of an error such as a 
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recent case, the Court limited the applicability of the Chapman 
standard for harmless error to direct review of constitutional error, 
excluding habeas corpus proceedings.27 The standard for assess-
ing the harmlessness of constitutional error in federal habeas 
proceedings is now the same as the harmless error standard for 
nonconstitutional errors.28 There would, thus, be a somewhat 
different analysis for determining if an error is harmless when the 
issues arise in a federal habeas proceeding than the analysis for 
determining if an error is harmless on direct review. Nevertheless, 
the threshold question of determining if the harmless error doctrine 
applies at all implicates the same underlying rationale of the 
doctrine in both direct-review and habeas cases. 
The threshold issue of when the harmless error doctrine is 
applicable, one of the most significant parameters of the Chapman 
doctrine, was recently summarized by the Supreme Court in a case 
on direct review. In Arizona v. Fulminante,29 the Court empha-
sized a distinction developed in a series of cases between "structur-
al" errors and "trial" errors.30 Harmless error analysis is not 
appropriate for "structural" errors that affect the integrity of the 
entire process. 31 In this instance, the outcome cannot be assumed 
to be reliable. 32 Thus, errors such as a biased tribunal or depriva-
coerced confeaaion. There ia no issue whether to apply the harmleu error standard in 
asseuing the ineffective Uliatance of counsel because a requirement of harm is written into 
the definition of the error. 
27 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). 
18 The Court in Brecht held that the appropriate harmleu error standard for federal 
habeas caaea is the standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
That standard calla for error to be reversible if the error - 'had substantial and il\iurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting 
Kottealws, 328 U.S. at 776). The KotUaJw. standard is considered leu demanding than the 
Chapman standard, which presumably results in fewer reversible errors for nonconstitu· 
tional errors than for constitutional errors. 
• 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
10 ld. at 1264-65. 
11 I d. The Court gave two elUUDplea of structural errors: a total deprivation of the right 
to counsel at trial, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and a judge who is not 
impartial, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). ld. 
n -without theae basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably aerve its function as 
a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded aa fundamentally fair." Fulminonte, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65, (quoting Roee v. Clark, 
478 u.s. 570, 577-78 (1986)). 
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tion of counsel cannot be subjected to a harmless error analysis. 33 
There are very few structural errors, however.34 
Almost all errors are classified as "trial" errors. The effect of a 
trial error on a verdict can presumably be determined. For 
example, Fourth Amendment error, which results in the admission 
of illegally seized evidence, is merely trial error.36 The harm from 
the admission of the evidence can arguably be calculated by 
separating the unconstitutional evidence from the properly 
admitted evidence. According to the Supreme Court, even Fifth 
Amendment error, as occurred in Fulminante where there was a 
coerced confession admitted at trial, is trial error.36 The Court 
noted in Fulminante that the effect of admitting an involuntary 
confession is determinable by assessing the other, properly 
admitted evidence. 37 
Consistent with its expansive view of the harmless error doctrine, 
the Supreme Court has extended the Chapman doctrine to the 
penalty phase of capital cases.38 In Satterwhite v. Texas,39 the 
as The Court in FulmiiWnk stated that, with structural errors, "[t)he entire conduct of 
the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected. • I d. at 1265. These and other 
structural errors comprise "structural defect(s] affect[ing] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial proceu itself.• Id. 
84 The FulmiiWnk Court lists the following structural errors: the total deprivation of the 
right to counsel at trial, the lack of an impartial judge, unlawful exclusion of members of the 
defendant's race from a grand jury, the right to self-representation, and the right to public 
trial. Id. at 1265. An erroneous instruction on the "beyond a reasonable doubt• standard, 
lessening the standard for conviction, was added to the list of structural errors in a recent 
decision. 8ft Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993). 
• FulmiiWnk, 111 S. Ct. at 1263. Moreover. the Court further separates Fourth 
Amendment claims from other constitutional errors because the Court views the reason to 
exclude the illegally seized evidence as independent of its effect on the reliability of the 
verdict. 
• Id. at 1265. 
11 Id. at 1265-66. The Court viewed an unconstitutional coerced confeuion as 
"indistinguishable from that of a confeuion obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment-of 
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment-or of a prosecutor's improper 
comment on a defendant's silence at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment.• I d. at 1265. 
The Court rejected the long-held view that the use of a coerced confeuion represented a more 
"fundamental• assault on the criminal justice system. Id. 
• Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), was the first mlijor death penalty case to 
employ the harmleu error doctrine. However, two years before Satterwhite, in 1986, the 
Court addrelled a harmless error iuue in a death penalty proceeding. 8ft Skipper v. South 
Carolina. 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In Skipper, however, the Court did not engage in a di8CU88ion 
of the applicability of the harmleu error analysis. After finding error in the exclusion of 
defendant's proffered witneues, who would have testified to defendant's "good acijustment• 
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Court applied a harmless error analysis to the erroneous admission 
of a psychiatrist's testimony in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment.40 The Court was unable to conclude that the evidence "did 
not influence the sentencing jury.""1 The error was not harmless. 
The psychiatrist's testimony was important in the State's case to 
prove that, under the Texas statute, the defendant was " 'a 
continuing threat to society.' ""2 
The harmless error test used by the Court in Satterwhite 
emphasized the impact of the improperly admitted evidence on the 
jurors' decision and not the weight of the properly admitted 
evidence.~ The Court rejected the Texas court's formulation that 
found the State's case "sufficient" without the unconstitutional 
evidence.'" The Court stated: "The question, however, is not 
whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the 
death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the 
State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ""5 
to jail, the Court concluded that the error was reversible error. Id. at 8. The Court was 
addressing the harmle88 error issue in a dismissive fashion without directly facing the issue 
as in Satterwhite. The Court in Skipper appears to assume for the purposes of argument 
that harmle88 error analysis applies, whereas in Satterwhite, the Court had to actually 
decide the iBBue . 
• 486 u.s. 249 (1988). 
40 There was obvious debate on the Court over the applicability of the harmless error 
doctrine to an •Estelle• violation, where defense counsel was not advised of a psychiatric 
examination to determine future dangerousne88 of the defendant, in violation of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages. I d . at 252-68. Although 
concurring in the judgment, Justices Marshall, Brennan and, in part, Blackmun, disagreed 
with the majority's conclusion that harmle88 error should apply in this instance. I d. at 260-
67 (Marshall, J., concurring). They recognized the different nature of the decision in the 
penalty phase, ealling it Ka discretionary, moral judgment involving a balancing of often 
intangible factors.• I d. at 265. As a result of the different decision in the penalty phase, the 
effect of admitting the psychiatric testimony was too indeterminate. Id. The concurring 
Justices wrote: "Divining the effect of psychiatric testimony on a sentencer'a determination 
whether death is an appropriate sentence is thus more in the province of soothsayers than 
appellate judges.• Id. See also Kenneth A. Zimmem, Note, Satterwhite v. Texas: A Return 
to Arbitrary Sentencing?, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 623 (1990) (criticizing the use of harmless error 
doctrine in Satterwhite). 
41 Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 260. 
42 ld. at 258 (quoting TExAs CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07l(bX2) (West 1988)). 
43 Id. at 258-60. 
" Id. at 258-59. 
46 Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
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Despite other evidence supporting a conclusion of future dangerous-
ness, the Court held that the State could not prove that the 
erroneously admitted psychiatric testimony did not contribute to 
the verdict. 48 
In Clemons v. Mississippi,41 the Court declared it constitutional 
to apply a harmless error doctrine to a death verdict where there 
was error in weighing an invalid aggravating circumstance. 48 The 
Court cautioned, however, that it was not mandating the use of a 
harmless error test for penalty phase errors. The Court specifically 
stated that state courts may find that, in particular situations, 
harmless error analysis is "extremely speculative or impossible. ""9 
The Supreme Court cases on the harmless error doctrine have 
defined the test and provided examples to guide its application. It 
is clear that the Court has given its imprimatur to applying the 
harmless error doctrine to most errors, including errors arising in 
" I d . at 260. There was significant other evidence of future dangerousness introduced. 
Besides the testimony of the psychiatrist, Dr. Grigson, the evidence presented at the 
sentencing phase included: (1) four prior convictions for violent crimes; (2) character 
testimony from eight police officers that Satterwhite was not "peaceful and law-abiding"; (3) 
testimony from "Satterwhite's mother's former husband . . . that Satterwhite had once shot 
him during an argument•; and ( 4) testimony from a county psychologist that Satterwhite was 
unable "to feel empathy or guilt• and that he would be a "continuing threat to society. • I d. 
at 259. Despite all of this evidence, the Court rejected the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' 
approach that the introduction of Dr. Grigson's testimony was harmless because the other 
evidence was sufficient to support a sentence of death. ld. at 260. The Court also, however, 
in dicta, assumed that the above testimony, without Dr. Grigson's testimony, was sufficient. 
Id. at 258. 
•
7 494 u.s. 738 (1990). 
" In Cle11Wns, the jury was instructed on two aggravating factors: "robbery for pecuniary 
gain• and "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel killing.• ld. at 742. The "heinous• factor 
was later considered invalid. ld. at 743. It was unclear if the Mississippi Supreme Court 
had reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors or if the court had applied a harmless 
error analysis in upholding the death verdict. ld. at 751-52. The United States Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of appellate reweighing of factors, but remanded in 
this case. I d . On the issue of reweighing, it was unclear if the Mississippi court had in fact 
reweighed the one aggravating factor against the mitigating evidence or if it had simply 
affirmed on the basis of a per se rule that a death verdict could stand if there was at least 
one valid aggravating circumstance. Id. The latter approach would violate the requirement 
that the legitimate factors be balanced against one another. ld. Similarly, with the 
harmless error analysis, it was unclear if the Mississippi court had properly considered the 
Chapman standard. The United States Supreme Court implied that the error was unlikely 
to be harmless in this case where the "heinous• factor played a significant role. ld. at 753-
54 . 
.ald. at 754. 
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the penalty phase of a capital case. There are still difficulties, 
however, in going from the concept of harmless error to its 
application. In part, the lack of clarity is due to variations in 
judging when a particular error "contributes" to the verdict in 
question. Another issue, of particular significance in the penalty 
phase, is whether the errors should be subject to the harmless error 
test at all, or whether the errors should be reversible per se. The 
next section addresses both of these issues as major interpretation-
al hurdles in understanding what the Court means by "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
II. INTERPRETATIONAL QUANDARIES 
Two major interpretational issues continue to surface. One is the 
relationship between the "harm" and the "correct result.»60 If the 
"correct result" is reached, should the error ever be viewed as 
harmful? The second issue is the basis for the decision to treat 
some errors as per se reversible and others as subject to a harmless 
error analysis. Is the difference truly a qualitative distinction? 
Both of these interpretational ·concerns are particularly important 
in applying the harmless error analysis to a penalty proceeding. 
The nature of each issue, as developed by the Supreme Court in 
non-capital cases and discussed by commentators, is presented in 
the following subsections as background to an analysis of the 
application of the harmless error doctrine to penalty proceedings in 
the next section. 
A. HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
One of the most troubling aspects in interpreting the Chapman 
standard has been the relationship between the "harm" and the 
"correct result." In some cases, the Supreme Court has focused on 
whether the erroneously included or excluded evidence "contribut-
10 See, e.g., 'l'RAYNOR, supra note 7, at 43 (di8CU88ing connection between Merror" and 
"judgment• in federal statute); Goldberg, supra note 7, at 428 (diacuasing different 
interpretations of harmlesa error teet); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 5, at 88-98 (criticizing 
Court's approach to harmlesa error and proposing that appropriate analysis would look at 
the purpose of the infringed right, whether a new trial can remedy the violation, and 
whether reversal eervee a deterrence function). 
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ed" to the verdict. 61 In other cases, the Court has emphasized 
whether the properly admitted evidence was "overwhelming. ,jS2 
Some commentators view the "contribute" test as quite different 
from the "overwhelming" test.63 Dissenting Justices, too, have 
criticized the use of the "overwhelming" test as being untrue to the 
"contribute" standard of Chapman. 64 And yet, the Court's majori-
61 See, e.g. , Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (• ..-be question is whether 
there is a reasonable poeaibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to 
the conviction.' • (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963))); Satterwhite v. 
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258, 260 (1988) (noting that •a reviewing court can make an intelligent 
judgment about whether the erroneous admi11ion of psychiatric testimony might have 
affected a capital sentencing jury- and holding "it impoeaible to aay beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [the psychiatrist's] expert testimony on the i11ue of Satterwhite's future 
dangerousne11 did not influence the sentencing jury-); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 
1246, 1257-58 (1991) (defining i11ue as whether erroneously admitted confession •did not 
contribute• to conviction and rejecting state court's finding that there was overwhelming 
evidence against defendant). 
61 See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (professing to be honoring 
Chapman and not •giving too much emphasis to 'overwhelming evidence,' • but concluding 
that case was •so overwhelmi~ against Harrington that the error was harmless); Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972) (finding erroneously admitted evidence harmless 
because of•overwhelming evidence of guilt• against defendant); Schneble v. Florida, 405 u.s. 
427, 431 (1972) (holding Bruton violation harmless because "independent evidence of guilt 
. . . [was] overwhelming" and inadmissible confe11ion cumulative). 
61 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 7, at 427-28 (commenting on HaninjJton and Chapman). 
Professor Goldberg points out that, if in Ho.rrinjJton the Court focused only upon the 
erroneously admitted confession without considering the properly admitted evidence, it would 
be almost impoeaible to conclude that the confession •did not contribute to Harrington's 
conviction. • I d. Profeaeor Goldberg also points out that the Court had changed the 
Chapman teat from one that -rorced the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict, into a teet which forced the defendant to show 
that the error was of such significance that without it the defendant would be entitled to a 
directed verdict of acquittal.• I d. at 428. Thus, if the change in focus from the erroneously 
admitted evidence to the properly admitted evidence shifts the burden of demonstrating the 
harm of the error to the defendant, almost all errors will be harmless. ld. 
See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CROONAL PRocEDURE§ 27.6 (2d ed. 1992) 
(stating that, while overlap between focusing on effect of the error and properly admitted 
evidence is arguably consistent with Chapman, the •acid test• of whether there is real 
difference will be a case where properly admitted evidence is overwhelming, but erroneously 
admitted evidence was so emphasized that jurors would have viewed it as ~ighly 
significant•). 
" See, e.g., HaninjJton, 395 U.S. at 255·56 (Brennan, J., diaaenting). Justice Brennan 
wrote that the Court, by looking to the overwhelming evidence against Harrington, "today 
overrules Chapman 11. Californw: ld. at 255. Justice Brennan clearly viewed the emphasis 
on the overwhelming evidence as qualitatively different from Chapman. ld. He believed 
Chapman meant -tMt for an error to be 'harmle11' it must have made no contribution to a 
criminal conviction. • I d. If not, he was concerned that •constitutional error may be 
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ty has claimed that it is applying the Chapman standard in the 
same breath that it uses the "overwhelming" test.66 
Some of the Court's confusion stems from its use of the word 
"contributes." Although Chapman set forth the test of whether the 
erroneously admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict, 66 
it is the application of that standard in subsequent cases that has 
given meaning to the word "contributes." The Court has analyzed 
whether erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the verdict 
by looking at the character of that evidence.67 The character of 
the erroneously admitted evidence in turn has involved looking at 
the error in the context of the other evidence at trial. 66 This is the 
point where the properly admitted evidence becomes a focal point 
under the Chapman test. Thus, for example, an analysis of 
whether an erroneously admitted confession contributed to the 
verdict requires looking at the effect of confessions in general as 
well as the other evidence of guilt admitted at trial.69 Confessions 
insulated from attack" if the appellate courts were able to ignore the constitutional error 
because of overwhelming evidence. I d. at 256. 
151 For example, inHarringron, 395 U.S. at 254, the Court states, "We do not depart from 
ChapTTUJn; nor do we dilute it by inference." The Court went on to find, however, that there 
was overwhelming evidence against Harrington, and thus the erroneous admission of a 
confession implicating Harrington was harmless. Id. at 254. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
67 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harrington, referred to the •character and quality" of 
the evidence. Harringron, 395 U.S. at 256. The mlijority in SaturwhiU emphasized the 
nature of the evidence, focusing on the fact that the erroneously admitted psychiatric 
testimony was so critical to the prosecution's case in the penalty phase. Satterwhite v. 
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 261 (1988). The mlijority opinion in Fulminanu also noted the nature 
of the erroneously admitted evidence-a confession-as such significant evidence in a 
criminal case that the appellate court should have •exercise{d] extreme caution before 
determining that the admission ... was harmless. • Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 
1257-58 (1991). 
68 See, e.g., Fulminanh!, 111 S. Ct. at 1258-61 (using the •contributes" standard to analyze 
the effect of an erroneously admitted confession in light of all the evidence at trial); see also 
Saturwhiu, 486 U.S. at 259-60 (analyzing the lack of significant other evidence of future 
dangerousness in determining whether erroneously admitted psychiatric evidence 
contributed to a finding of future dangerousness and concluding that the error was not 
harmless) . 
.. See, e.g., Fulminan~. 111 S. Ct. at 1257-61. The Fulminanu Court held that, without 
the erroneously admitted confession, the case against the defendant was weak. Id. at 1258. 
The Fulminanh! Court looked at the effect of the admission of the confession on the other 
evidence at trial and noted that, without the erroneously admitted confession, a second 
confession, also admitted in evidence, would have been conaiderably leu convincing. Id. at 
1259. The defendant had allegedly confessed to a jailhouse informant and then to the 
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are usually considered strong factors in jurors' minds. 80 At the 
same time, there may be circumstances where a court could 
conclude that a particular confession was inconsequential to the 
jury's decision.61 The nature of the constitutional error and the 
properly admitted evidence at trial are, thus, intertwined in the 
Chapman standard. 
Although intertwined, the Court's emphasis on one of the two 
threads-the nature of the constitutional error or the properly 
admitted evidence-significantly affects the result. When the Court 
has focused on the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence, 
emphasizing the significance of that evidence and analyzing 
whether that evidence "contributed" to the verdict, the Court has 
informant's wife. I d. at 1258-59. The confession to the jailhouse informant was erroneously 
admitted at trial because it was found to have been coerced. ld. at 1252. The confession to 
the wife was suspect both because the context made it unlikely defendant would confess to 
her and because she had reasons to make up the confession to support the story of her 
jailhouse informant husband. ld. at 1259. 
The Court further analyzed the effect of the admission of the impermissible confession on 
the sentencing decision and again found that the credibility of the second confession would 
have been doubtful without the first confession. ld. at 1260. With only the second, less 
credible confession, the Court believed there would be insufficient evidence to support an 
aggravating circumstance. ld. 
80 See, e.g., id. at 1257 (referring to defendant's confession as " 'probably the most 
probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him' " and noting that 
" 'confessions have profound impact on the jury' " (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123, 139-40 (1968))). 
'
1 See, e.g., Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 (finding the unconstitutional admission of 
codefendants' confessions that implicated defendant was harmless error in light of the 
"overwhelming" evidence against defendant). But see id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing strenuously that one could not conclude that the two codefendants' confessions "did 
not contribute to Harrington's conviction"). See al8o Goldberg, aupra note 7, at 427. 
ProfeBBOr Goldberg convincingly points out that, if one looks at the nature of the evidence, 
the codefendants' confessions, "[i)t is difficult to imagine how any court . .. could determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions ... did not contribute to Harrington's convic· 
tion-particularly when those confessions described the fourth participant as 'the white 
guy.' " I d. at 257. Harrington was the only white man charged out of the group of 
defendants. Harrington, 395 U.S. at 250. See alao Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1258 ("'n the 
case of a coerced confession .. • the risk that the confession is unreliable, coupled with the 
profound impact that the confession has upon the jury, requires a reviewing court to exercise 
extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was 
harmless."). 
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found that the error was not harmless.62 In contrast, when the 
Court has focused on the properly admitted evidence and analyzed 
whether that evidence created an overwhelming case against the 
defendant, the Court has found the error harmless. 63 The differ-
ing emphasis by the Court may be due to philosophical differences 
about the goal of the harmless error doctrine. 64 
According to the Court in a recent case, the goal of the harmless 
error doctrine is to keep the judicial system focused on the 
defendant's guilt or innocence through a fair, but not error free 
trial.66 In Fulminante, the Court stated: 
[T]he harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve 
the 'principle that the central purpose of a criminal 
trial is to decide the factual question of the defen-
dant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public 
respect for the criminal process by focusing on the 
11 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) (holding that the Court could 
not conclude that improper. comments on defendants' silence did not contribute to verdict); 
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 260 (holding that the Court could not conclude that a psychiatrist's 
testimony regarding defendant's future dangerousness "did not influence the sentencing 
jury"); Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1258-59 (finding erroneously admitted confeuion affected 
believability of only other significant evidence against defendant; therefore, admission of 
confession waa not harmless beyond reasonable doubt); .ee al80 Roy v. Hall, 521 F.2d 120 (1st 
Cir. 1975) (analyzing thoroughly the intertwining of ideas of"overwhelming evidence• with 
the "contributes• test). The Roy court found that, even though there were two other 
•confessions: admiuibility of a third confession could not be harmless error. Id. at 124. The 
court first refuted the argument that the evidence was overwhelming by going through all 
the evidence for and against defendant. /d. at 122. The court next looked at four pouible 
ways that the third confeuion waa significant in establishing the case against the defendant. 
Id. at 122-23. The court then found a reasonable possibility that the confession would have 
contributed to the verdict. Id. at 123. Despite the finding on harmleu error, the court 
ultimately found that there was no error in admitting the confeuion. /d. at 124. 
13 See, e.g., Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254 (finding evidence against defendant "so 
overwhelmi~); Milton v. Wainright, 407 U.S. 371, 373 (1972) (noting "overwhelming 
evidence of petitioner's guilt•); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 (1972) (finding 
"'independent evidence of guilt here overwhelmi~). 
14 For example, compare the mlijority view in Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265-66 (rejecting 
either a deterrence rationale or a concept that an involuntary confession is so "fundamental" 
a right in the course of holding that the harmless error analysis applies to an involuntary 
confession) with the diuenting view, id. at 1253-57 (White, J., diuenting) (stating that 
regardless of the ability to aueu the impact of the error on the verdict, some rights 
represent "'important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial," 
rendering harmle11 error analysis inappropriate). 
• Id. at 1246. 
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underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the 
virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.>66 
139 
By equating a "fair" trial with one that correctly determines guilt 
or innocence, the Court has justified its emphasis on the over-
whelming evidence of guilt.67 In contrast, dissenting Justices have 
viewed a "fair" trial as incorporating a value in the process or a 
particular right. For example, the dissenters in Fulminante would 
have found the admission of a coerced confession reversible per se 
because a verdict based on such evidence would be "inconsistent 
with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitorial system of criminal 
justice. ,sa 
The application of the harmless error doctrine shifts with the 
viewpoint of the court. If the goal is a correct determination of 
guilt or innocence, then many errors can be found harmless as long 
as there is sufficient justification for the verdict. If the goal 
includes honoring an inherent value in the right denied, then 
harmless error cannot be found as often. Otherwise the right 
denied will be slighted. 69 The same language from Chapman, 
thus, is interpreted differently based upon the underlying assump-
tions about a "fair" trial. 
Another criticism of looking at the overwhelming nature of the 
evidence against the defendant is that the appellate court is 
usurping the jury's function. If the appellate court is analyzing 
whether the jury in a particular case reached the correct result, the 
court is necessarily re-evaluating the same evidence that the jurors 
• Id. at 1264 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
87 Ogletree, supra note 5, at 162-63. 
N Fulminanre, 111 S. Ct. at 1256 (White, J., dissenting); Bee also Ogletree, 11upra note 5, 
at 163-72. While criticizing both the logic of applying harmless error to involuntary 
confessions that will almost, if not always, have contributed to the verdict and the logic and 
precedent for considering only the accuracy of verdict concerns, Professor Ogletree cogently 
expresses the societal concern, apart from accuracy, for a system free from reprehensible 
police techniques. Id. See also Stacy & Dayton, 11upra note 5, at 91-98 (proposing analysis 
that focuses on purpose of the right infringed). 
•This was Justice Brennan's concern in Harrington, where he noted that an •overwhelm-
ing" evidence test would mean that the constitutional rights of the defendants would be 
unprotected. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J ., dissenting); 
Bee also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 438 ("The result of the harmless constitutional error 
doctrine at the trial court level is to encourage the diminution of rights against the 
government for all individuals against whom the state has an overwhelming case.•). 
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had to evaluate. 70 The problem with the appellate court conduct-
ing this evaluation is that the appellate justices did not hear or see 
the live testimony. They cannot evaluate the demeanor of the 
witnesses.71 Moreover, our system is based on lay jurors making 
the factfinding determinations, with the appellate courts reviewing 
errors of law. 72 The overwhelming evidence approach skews the 
delicate balance between the trial and appellate roles. 73 
B. HARMLESS OR PER SE REVERSmLE? 
The Supreme Court's approach to harmless error has also been 
criticized for making a distinction between "structural" and "trial" 
errors. The Court has created a distinction between a structural 
error that affects the "framework" of the trial and a trial error that 
affects the "process" of the trial. 74 The "framework" includes an 
unbiased judge, counsel or self-representation, a public trial, a 
grand jury selected without race discrimination, 76 and an instruc-
tion that accurately requires the standard of beyond a reasonable 
doubt.76 The "process" includes evidence introduced at trial and 
instructions given to the jury. 77 The distinction is critical because 
trial errors are subject to the harmless error doctrine, but structur-
70 See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 429-31 (describing appellate court that focuses on the 
properly admitted evidence as Kappellate jury" and explaining that appellate court is 
operating as the Kprimary factfmdero if it is assessing whether actual evidence at trial was 
"overwhelmi~). 
11 See id. at 430 (describing demeanor only available to first-hand juror observation). 
72 Appellate courts ordinarily only review the sufficiency or weight of the evidence as a 
matter of law. See id. at 427-32 (discu88ing usurpation of jwy). 
I d. 
11 See id. at 429. Professor Goldberg states: 
When an appellate court tests for harmle88ness by reviewing the record 
to determine whether the remainder of the evidence is so overwhelming 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict, it sits as an appellate 
jury ... . An appellate court defies common sense when it steps out of its 
traditional role as a reviewing court and attempts to operate as a 
primary factfinder. 
74 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991) (di&CUBsing constitutional 
errors which are not subject to harmle88 error standards); see also infra notes 29-37 and 
accompanying text (di8CU88ing Fulminanu). 
76 Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1265. 
7
• Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993). 
11 Fulminanu, 111 S. Ct. at 1263. 
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al errors are per se reversible. 
Professor Ogletree has pointed out that the premise underlying 
the distinction between structural and trial errors is inaccurate. 78 
As he discusses, the Court assumes that it is possible, or at least 
easier, to determine whether the result is correct if the error is a 
trial error and that it is impossible, or very difficult, to determine 
whether the result is correct if the error is a structural error.79 
Professor Ogletree points out that, even with the structural error 
of a biased judge, the evidence against the defendant could be so 
overwhelming that there is no question about the correctness of the 
result.80 Thus, the assumption underlying the distinction between 
structural and trial errors-that one cannot determine the correct-
ness of the result with structural errors-is simply wrong. 
Professor Ogletree explains that the assumption is flawed because 
the "structure,. referred to in "structural erro~ is a fair trial. 81 In 
tum, fair trial is defined in terms of the correctness of the re-
sult. 82 Thus, in the end, a structural error is not very different 
from a trial error. 83 
The Court has avoided the problem in logic identified by 
Professor Ogletree by focusing on the labels instead of the underly-
ing reasoning for distinguishing trial and structural errors. The 
Court has acknowledged the reasoning that errors should be per se 
reversible when the prejudice is difficult to calculate, but only when 
describing accepted structural errors. For example, in Fulminante, 
the Court stated that structural errors "defy analysis by 'harmless-
error' standards..a. and that a structural error means that the trial 
" 'cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination 
of guilt or innocence.' ..s6 In contrast, the Court has treated the 
speculative nature of the harm as merely an aspect of whether the 
error in the particular case is harmless when speaking of trial 
errors. For example, in Satterwhite, although cautioning that it 
18 Ogletree, auprc note 5, at 161. 
18 ld. at 159-60. 
10 ld. at 165. 
II Jd. at 164. 
•rd. 
81 ld. 
114 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991). 
86 ld. (quoting Roae v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). 
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might be difficult to assess the impact of error in a capital penalty 
phase, the Court found it constitutional to apply a harmless error 
analysis to the evidentiary error of unconstitutionally admitted 
psychiatric evidence. 86 
The Court•s analysis has become one of categorizing errors as 
structural or trial, based on an assumption that the harm of trial 
errors can be assessed by evaluating the other evidence at trial. 
The reasoning that an error should be treated as per se reversible 
if it is difficult or nearly impossible to calculate its effect is 
submerged in trial-structural nomenclature. The speculative 
impact of some errors simply makes it more difficult to declare an 
error harmless, but does not foreclose the inquiry. 87 
Similarly, the laudable idea that certain errors affect such 
fundamental rights that they cannot be considered harmless is now 
an abandoned thought. The significance of the right is analyzed 
through the structural-trial error dichotomy. Fulminante is the 
best example of this phenomenon. The Court analyzed the use of 
a coerced confession at trial in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment-long considered so sacrosanct that no such error could be 
harmless-as trial evidence. 86 The Court focused only on the 
confession as one piece of evidence that could be segregated from 
the rest of the evidence and its impact thus assessed. The 
Fulminante decision is certainly a powerful indicator that the Court 
is no longer valuing the nature of the right involved in its determi-
11 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988). 
17 See, e.g., id. at 260-67 (Marshall, J ., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and, in part, by Justice Blackmun, 
criticized the ~Il~Vority's conclusion that the harmleaa error doctrine should apply in 
SatterwhiU. The dissenters believed that a harmless error analysis should never apply to 
the admi88ion of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
established in Estelle 11. Smith. ld. (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
Emphasizing both the nature of the decision in the penalty phase and the need for greater 
reliability in a death case, Justice Marshall argued that the penalty phase decision called 
for •a profoundly moral evaluation of the defendant's character and crime." ld. at 261. 
According to Justice Marshall, a reviewing court, thus, engages in •a dangerously speculative 
enterprise• in "predicting the reaction of a sentencer to a proceeding untainted by 
constitutional error on the basis of a cold record.• /d. at 262. Justice Marshall also voiced 
concern with the reliability of a death sentence, noting that harmle88 error analysis impinges 
on reliability by allowing a court to substitute its judgment for what a trier would have done 
for an actual judgment by a constitutionally untainted sentencer. ld. 
81 See suprc notes 36-37 and accompanying text (di8CU88ing effect of admi88ion of 
involuntary confe88ion). 
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nation whether to apply the harmless error analysis. 89 
The Court is, thus, placing great reliance on the structural-trial 
error categories for applying harmless error rather than an analysis 
of the symbolic significance of the right infringed. Interpretation 
of the structural-trial categories is resulting in subjecting more 
constitutional errors to the harmless error analysis. Few constitu-
tional violations affect the framework, or structure, of the trial, as 
defined by the Court. This categorization is coupled with an 
increasing emphasis on equating harmless error with the correct 
result. The interpretation of the Chapman "contributes to the 
verdict" standard, although unsettled, appears to be moving in the 
direction of analyzing how overwhelming the case is against the 
defendant. Both of these ongoing interpretational quagmires affect 
the analysis of harmless error in the context of the penalty phase 
of a capital case. The next section addresses the use of the 
harmless error doctrine, with its rationale and current interpreta-
tional issues, in the penalty phase. 
Ill. THE HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE PENALTY PHAsE 
In assessing the application of the harmless error analysis to a 
capital penalty phase, there are two critical areas of inquiry. First, 
should a harmless error analysis be applied to almost all penalty 
phase errors in the pervasive manner that it is applied to guilt 
phase errors? Second, when a harmless error analysis is applied 
to penalty phase errors, how should a court analyze the impact of 
an error on the penalty phase decisional process? Both questions 
hinge on an understanding of the difference in the nature of the 
decisional processes in the guilt and penalty phases. The discus-
sion of these issues is subdivided into three subsections. The first 
sets forth a description of a penalty proceeding and the nature of 
11 Profe880r Ogletree and Professors Stacy and Dayton suggest that the better approach 
would be to analyze the purposes of the right at stake in lieu of focusing exclusively on the 
accuracy of the result. Their approaches would value the right involved as well as alleviate 
the logical flaws in the structural-trial dichotomy. See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 168-72 
(raiaing iaeue of•societal interest• in protecting constitutional rights); Stacy & Dayton, supra 
note 5, at 91-98 (proposing an analysis that would consider (1) the impact of the error on the 
purpose of the right; (2) whether -redoing the proceu• will rectify the error; and (3) the 
import of deterrence). 
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the decisionmaking. The second subsection focuses on how the 
rationale of the doctrine supports applying the harmless error 
doctrine differentially to the penalty phase. The third subsection 
takes a practical look at how a court should assess the harm of an 
error in the penalty phase. 
A. THE PENALTY PHASE DECISION 
The penalty phase in a capital case is typically an evidentiary 
proceeding separate from the guilt phase. 90 The proceeding is 
usually presented to the same jury that sat for the guilt phase,91 
although a different jury may be impaneled,92 or a judge alone can 
preside.93 The prosecutor's role is to establish at least one statuto-
ry aggravating factor. Typical aggravating factors include murders 
committed during a serious felony, such as a robbery; committed for 
pecuniary gain; committed to prevent capture on another crime; or 
committed with a great risk of death to others besides the vic-
tim. 94 In those jurisdictions where the aggravating factor is 
10 See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (Deering 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) 
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993); TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CoDE ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1993). 
'
1 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(c) (Msarne jury" for penalty); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
921.141(1) (penalty proceeding before ~rial jury"); TEx. CJUM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071, 
§ 2(a) (penalty proceeding before the ~rial jury"). 
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(c) (new jury can be impaneled if Mgood cause• to 
di8miaa original jury); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(1) (new jury may be impaneled ifthere is 
an Mimpouibility or inability" for trial jury to continue); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(1) (West 
Supp. 1993) (court may discharge guilt phase jury for Mgood cause• and impanel new jury). 
" States are not uniform in their approaches to waiver of jury. For example, in some 
states, the defendant can waive the jury, although the prosecution may have to consent to 
the waiver. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT § 565.006 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (if state consents, 
defendant may waive penalty phase jury). In some states, the defendant can waive the jury, 
but only if there was a plea or a trial to the bench in the guilt phase. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 16 and CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.4(b) (if defendant pleaded guilty or was tried by 
judge alone in guilt phase, defendant may waive penalty jury with consent of state); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (if defendant pleaded guilty or waived jury for guilt phase, defendant 
may also waive penalty phase jury); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(1) (if defendant pleaded 
guilty or waived jury for guilt phase, court may conduct penalty proceeding without jury on 
motion of defendant and with consent of prosecution). 
N An aggravating factor must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 190.4(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-2(c)(2)(a). Aggravating factors, which elevate 
murder to capital murder, are statutorily listed. Typical aggravating factors include whether 
defendant baa been convicted of another murder; whether the defendant purposely or 
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim; whether 
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established in the guilt phase, the prosecutor in the penalty phase 
may present other aggravating evidence, such as the defendanfs 
prior convictions. 96 The defense role in the penalty phase is to 
present mitigating evidence, such as physical or mental problems, 
absence of a criminal history, or youth. 96 Although mitigating 
the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated assault to the victim; whether the defendant 
committed the murder as consideration for receipt of anything of pecuniary value; whether 
the defendant procured the murder by payment or promise of anything of pecuniary value; 
whether the murder was committed to escape detection, apprehension, trial, punishment, or 
confinement for another offense; whether the murder was committed while the defendant 
was committing, attempting, or escaping a murder, robbery, sexual a88ault, arson, burglary, 
or kidnapping; whether the victim was a public servant engaged in the performance of his 
official duties or because of the victim's status as a public servant. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:ll-
3(cX4). Florida's statutory factors comprise another representative list: the capital felony 
was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; the defendant was previously 
convicted of another capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person; the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many people; the capital 
felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in, was an accomplice, was 
attempting, or was in flight after committing robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, 
kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or bombing; the capital felony was committed for purpose of 
avoiding or preventing arrest or escaping from custody; the capital felony was committed for 
pecuniary gain; the capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the exercise of any 
governmental function or law enforcement; the capital felony was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel; the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated 
manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. FLA. STAT. ANN. f 921.141(5). 
16 In some states, the •aggravating factor" must be proved during the guilt phase of the 
trial. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE f 190.4; TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. f 19.03 (West 1989 & 
Supp. 1993). In other states, the aggravating factor is proved during the penalty phase. See, 
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. f 2C:ll-3(c)(2Xa). 
16 Some states list a variety of factors that may be either aggravating or mitigating. See, 
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE f 190.3(a)-(k). California's statute includes the following: the 
circumstances of crime for which defendant was convicted, including special circumstances 
perf 190.1; criminal activity which involved use or attempted use of force by defendant; 
prior felony convictions; extreme mental or emotional disturbance during offense; the victim's 
participation in defendant's homicidal conduct or act; whether defendant reasonably believed 
circumstances provided a moral justification or extenuation; whether defendant acted under 
extreme dure88 or substantial domination of another person; whether at time of offense the 
defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease, defect, or effects of 
intoxication; defendant's age at time of crime; whether defendant was an accomplice to the 
offense or his relative minor participation; or any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it not be a legal excuse. Id. 
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circumstances may be statutorily listed, 97 the defense is also 
entitled to present evidence relevant to nonstatutory mitigating 
factors.98 Closing arguments are presented as in a typical trial.99 
The most unusual feature of the penalty phase is the task for the 
jury or judge. Their decision involves a determination whether 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and, therefore, 
death is warranted. 100 The decision is a judgment call on the 
relative weight of factors, unlike the assessment of the existence of 
facts in the guilt phase.101 The penalty phase decision, therefore, 
17 Typical statutory lists of mitigating factors include: "the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to 
proeecution; the victim solicited, participated in, or consented to the conduct which resulted 
in his death; the age of the defendant at the time of the murder; the defendant's capacity to . 
appreciate the wrongfulnesa of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of 
the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, 
but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution; the defendant was under 
unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution; the 
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; the defendant rendered 
substantial aaaistance to the State in the proeecution of another person for the crime of 
murder; or any other factor relevant to the defendant's character or record or the 
circumstances of the offense.• N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(cX5). See FLA. ANN. STAT. § 
921.141(6) for a similar list. 
11 See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (reversing death sentence because 
improper instruction to jury excluded consideration of nonstatutory mitigating factors and 
citing line of cases recognizing constitutional requirement that nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances be considered: Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)). 
• Gary Goodpaster, TM Trial for Life: Effective Asst.ta~ ofCounMl in Death PeTUJlty 
Ccues, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 334-38 (1983); Roy B. Herron, Defendi"'I Life in Tennessee 
Death PeTUJlty Cases, 51 TENN. L. REv. 681, 732-763 (1984). 
100 The actual formulation of the decision varies. In some states, the sentencer must 
decide if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(aX2) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3; N.J . STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:ll.a(cX3); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(DX1) (Anderson 1993). Arkansas 
additionally requires that the sentencer find that the •[a]ggravating circumstances justify 
a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. • ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(aX3). In other 
states, the basic weighing formulation is reversed, requiring the sentencer to find that there 
are mitigating circumstances that outweigh the aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 921.141(2)-(3); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 519-l(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4X3) (Vernon Supp. 1993). Texas has an unusual formulation 
where death can be imposed only if the jury answers three specific questions affirmatively. 
TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b). 
101 Like the formulation of the weighing decision, the precise judgment call varies, too. 
See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990)(upholding Pennsylvania statute that 
required sentencer to impose death if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating 
circumstances). In other states, the sentencer is expresaly authorized to impose life 
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allows for more individual variation in the reasoning for the 
decision than is permitted in the guilt phase.102 
The use of the mitigating factors by individual jurors also inserts 
variability into the process.103 Each juror may assess the value 
of a given mitigating circumstance individually and may weigh that 
mitigating circumstance as he or she chooses.104 For example, 
suppose the jury has found an aggravating circumstance of a double 
homicide to exist. The defense has presented three possible 
mitigating factors: (1) the defendant was abused as a child; (2) the 
defendant was addicted to drugs; and (3) the defendant is very 
remorseful. Juror 1 could decide that all three mitigating factors 
together outweigh the aggravating factor. Juror 2 could decide that 
the child abuse alone outweighs the aggravating factor. Juror 3 
could decide that the child abuse and the addiction are strong 
mitigating factors, that the defendant was not really remorseful, 
and conclude that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the 
imprisonment if that is deemed the appropriate penalty, regardleBB of the outcome of the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. ~ 5-4-
603(aX3) (sentencer must find that •[a]ggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death 
beyond a reasonable doubt"); Mo. ANN. STAT. ~ 565.030(4X4) (sentencer may decide, even 
after weighing proceBB, "under all of the circumstances not to 888eBB and declare the 
punishment of death"); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah, 1982) (holding sentencer 
must decide, in addition to finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, that death ia appropriate penalty beyond a reaaonable doubt), cert. denied, 
459 u.s. 988 (1982). 
For a more extensive diBCUBaion of the statutory variations, see Linda E. Carter,A Beyond 
tJ ReaiiOTJtJbk Doubt SttJndtJrd in Death Perw.lty Proceeding•: A Neglected Ekment of 
FtJirMBB, 52 Omo ST. L. J . 195 (1991). 
101 Greater individual variation in the penalty reaaoning is, in large part, a result of the 
requirement that there be individualized consideration of the defendant and his or her 
circumtJtancea before a death sentence may be imposed. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978). For further analysis of the seeming inconsistency between individualized 
consideration of the defendant and the need to avoid arbitrarineBB, see Scott E. Sundby, The 
Loclrett PtJra.do%: Reconciling Guided Di8cretion tJnd Unguided MitigtJtion in Ct~pittJl 
Sentencing, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1991) (finding consistency in the dual constitutional 
requirements or individual consideration through mitigating circumstances and the 
channeling of discretion through regulating aggravating circumstances). 
101 &e WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY 1N THE NlNETlES 73-92 (1991) (di8CU811ing 
the effect or almost unlimited mitigating evidence in the penalty phase). 
106 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990) (holding it unconstitutional 
to require jurors to find unanimously that a mitigating circumstance exists and that each 
juror is entitled to consider mitigating evidence he or abe considers relevant to the penalty 
decision). 
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aggravating factors. 106 The result of the latitude given to the 
jurors is that there is much greater uncertainty in how a piece of 
evidence will be used. 
The nature of the decision in the penalty phase is, thus, quite 
different from the decision in the guilt phase. In the guilt phase of 
a capital case, as in any other criminal trial, the jury or judge must 
reach a decision whether certain facts exist. Suppose, for example, 
that in order to convict a defendant of murder in the first degree, 
the factfinder must find that the defendant caused the death of a 
human being, with a purpose to kill, and with premeditation and 
deliberation.106 The factfmder is ultimately asked whether each 
element exists or not. Although the factfinder is making value 
judgments about the strength of the evidence to support each 
element, the ultimate finding is whether the facts that the 
defendant killed, with intent, and with premeditation and delibera-
tion are true or not. 
In contrast, the sentencer in a capital case must first find 
whether certain facts exist and then apply a value judgment to 
those facts. The judge or jury in the penalty phase must decide 
whether the evidence is convincing that an aggravating circum-
stance exists and whether any mitigating circumstances exist. 107 
These assessments by the judge or jury are essentially comparable 
to the factfmder's task in the guilt phase in decidingifthe elements 
of the crime exist.108 The sentencer, however, is asked to do 
106 See, e.g., id. at 451 (Blackmun, J ., concurring) (describing a scenario from Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1986), where "all12 jurors agreed that sonu mitigating factors 
were present, and outweighed the factors in aggravation, but the jury was not unanimous 
as to the existence of any particular mitigating circumstance• as example of unconstitutional 
limitation on the consideration of mitigation). 
106 States vary in the formulation of their murder statutes. See, e.g. , Omo REv. CODE 
ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Anderson 1992) ("No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation 
and design, cause the death of another.•). 
107 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 
1993); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B). 
101 Although the decision of whether a mitigating factor exists is comparable to finding 
an element of a crime, there is one striking difference. Unlike a trial where all the jurors 
must agree that an element exists, jurors in the penalty phase are free to decide individually 
whether mitigating circumstances exist or not. See infra text accompanying notes 125-127 
(diSCUBsing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), where the Court held it reversible 
error to require jurors to find a mitigating circumstance unanimously). There are also more 
subjective evaluations in determining if a mitigating circumstance exists than are typical in 
determining if an element of a crime exists. See WHITE, •upro note 103, at 75 (noting that 
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more. The sentencer is asked to take the facts found-the aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances-and balance them against 
each other.109 The balancing is virtually unguided.110 The senten-
cer must make a value judgment whether one group of facts 
(aggravating circumstances) is greater, the same as, or less than 
another group of facts (the. mitigating circumstances).111 Nothing 
comparable is asked of the factfmder in the guilt phase. The 
weighing in the penalty phase would be similar to asking the 
factfinder in the guilt phase to decide if, given that the elements of 
murder exist and that the elements of self-defense exist, either 
should outweigh the other. Needless to say, the factfinder in the 
guilt phase is not asked to make such a judgment call. The jury 
instructions will state that self-defense prevails if its elements are 
satisfied. 112 The jurors are asked only to assess the existence of 
the elements of the defense and not whether, in their judgment, the 
defense should outweigh the crime. 
The nature of the decision in the penalty phase-the value-based 
judgment call-cannot be ignored in applying the harmless error 
doctrine. The validity of the harmless error doctrine is based on 
the assumption that the effect of the error is determinable. 113 If 
the effect of the error on the verdict is minimal, the error is 
harmless. If the effect of the error on the verdict is too speculative, 
the reliability of the verdict is suspect. Thus, if the defendant is 
denied counsel during a trial, the effect of that error is so pervasive 
mitigating circumstances call for "subjective judgments; such as "whether the defendant 
played a relatively minor role in a crime" or "whether he was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of a killing"). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
110 See WHITE, supra note 103, at 76. 
m See WHITE, supra note 103, at 75-76 (recognizing "value judgment" in weighing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision 
Maki11(1 in the Capital Pe114lty PlwM, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 189-90 (1992) (suggesting 
penalty decision is •value-laden decision" which will be influenced by "fairness or group 
values; whereas guilt decision is "factual" and influenced by "facts and information"); id. at 
197-99 (noting penalty decision is "qualitatively different" from guilt determination); James 
C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentenci11(1, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 740, 755-56 (1987) (proposing sentencer decide the importance of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances). 
112 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (noting situations where self-defense is justifiable 
homicide). 
m See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (finding harmless error doctrine not 
appropriate where error is "unquantifiable and indeterminate"). 
150 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:125 
and difficult to calculate that the error cannot be declared harm-
less. The effect of an error in the weighing decision in the penalty 
phase of a capital case is as speculative a proposition as guessing 
what the effect is of trying a defendant without counsel. The 
individual choices jurors make about the existence of mitigating 
circumstances coupled with the unique weighing of factors creates 
a proceeding fundamentally different from a guilt trial. 
An analysis of harmless error in the penalty phase should be 
refmed to take into account the unique characteristics of the 
decision. The next two subsections discuss an approach to the use 
of the harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase that considers 
both the rationale of the doctrine and the nature of the penalty 
phase decision. 
B. HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE RARELY APPROPRIATE IN PENALTY 
PHASE 
The harmless error doctrine was developed and applied to 
constitutional error for sound reasons. If the Supreme Court is 
going to base its application of the harmless error doctrine on 
allegiance to its rationale, however, the doctrine must be used 
sparingly, if at all, in the penalty phase of a capital case.114 The 
Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of applying the harmless 
error doctrine in capital cases in both SatterwhitP. v. Texas115 and 
Clemons v. Mississippi. 116 The Court's dichotomy between struc-
tural117 and trial118 errors, developed to identify those errors 
where the harmless error doctrine applies, must be interpreted 
based on the nature of the penalty phase decision. 
Structural error, as understood in Fulminante, should remain 
reversible per se as in a typical trial. 119 Thus, a biased judge or 
m See Scoville, supra note 111, at 757 (suggesting harmless error doctrine should not 
apply to either constitutional or nonconstitutional error in penalty phase). 
Ill 486 u.s. 249 (1988). 
111 494 U.S. 738 (1990); IIH cU.o supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (discusaing 
difficulty in applying harmless error doctrine). 
117 Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991). 
111 /d. at 1264. 
111 See supra notes29-34 and accompanying text. But see Scoville, supra note 111, at 757, 
(suggesting that because court can determine the effect of structural errors, harmless error 
analysis would be more appropriate for those errors than it is for evidentiary errors). 
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denial of counsel in the penalty phase should result in an automat-
ic reversal. 120 These errors, which affect the framework of the 
penalty proceeding, are too invasive of the entire process to apply 
the harmless error doctrine reliably. 121 
Additionally, however, the category of reversible per se errors 
should include a broader array of errors in the penalty phase than 
in the guilt phase. Structural errors are reversible per se because 
they pervade the entire process, rendering it difficult to assess the 
effect of the error.122 Thus, if the reasoning underlying the 
separation of structural from trial errors has any vitality, there is 
a sound case to be made that errors which contaminate the entire 
penalty phase process must be reversible per se as structural 
errors. Indeed, the Court in Clemons appeared to anticipate that 
errors in the penalty phase might create a problem in applying the 
harmless error doctrine. 123 The Court encouraged an analysis by 
the state courts of the appropriateness of using a harmless error 
analysis. 12• Consequently, where it is difficult to determine the 
effect of an error, legitimate grounds exist to treat the error as 
structural, even if the same error would be a trial error in the guilt 
phase. Instructional error and evidentiary error provide useful 
examples of the need to evaluate penalty phase error as reversible 
per se independent of the status of such error in a guilt proceeding. 
Instructional error in the penalty phase, particularly error in 
instructing the jury on how to deal with aggravating and mitigating 
factors, has a more systemic effect in that phase than does an error 
in instructing the jury on how to assess evidence in the guilt phase. 
The Supreme Court recognized the systemic effect of an instruction-
al .error in the penalty phase in McKoy v. North Carolina. 126 In 
McKoy, the Court held that it was reversible error to instruct jurors 
uo These are the examples of structural errors given by the Court in Fulminante. See 
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 32-33 (diBCUBsing holding of Fulminante Court). 
122 See supra notes 32-33 (diBCUBsing holding of Fulminante Court). 
123 Clemons v. Miuissippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990). 
U4 ld. (Min some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that peculiarities in a 
case make appellate reweighing or harmless error analysis extremely speculative or 
impoBBible. "). 
136 494 U.S. 433 (1990); see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding 
instructions were unconstitutional where it was pouible for jury to understand that they 
could only consider mitigating circumstances found unanimously). 
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that they had to find a mitigating circumstance unanimously in 
order to consider it. 126 Such an instruction, if followed, might 
have unconstitutionally precluded the consideration of mitigating 
circumstances determined to be important by the individual 
jurors.127 Other than in an extreme case, such as in McKoy 
where jurors were literally precluded from considering mitigating 
evidence, however, lower courts generally have failed to consider 
the different nature of a penalty proceeding in assessing the impact 
of an erroneous instruction. 
For example, in Delap v. Dugger,128 the Florida Supreme Court 
applied the harmless error analysis to an erroneous jury instruction 
without considering the nature of the decision as a value judgment. 
The trial court had instructed the jury only on statutory mitigating 
circumstances, leaving the impression that the jury could not 
consider nonstatutory mitigating factors.129 The Florida Supreme 
Court found the error harmless. 130 According to the court, the 
error was offset by the introduction of the nonstatutory mitigating 
evidence, emphasis by the prosecutor that the evidence was 
relevant, and the lack of any direct instruction by the court to 
disregard such evidence. 131 In addition, the court found that the 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances of defendant's " 'acceptable' " 
"trial and prison conduct" and " 'perhaps' " "some remorse" were 
inconsequential given the five aggravating factors. 132 
The latter reasoning indicates that the Florida court was 
implicitly assuming that all jurors would dismiss the nonstatutory 
mitigating evidence. Each juror can assess the mitigating factors 
differently in different combinations, however, and is ultimately 
making an independent value judgment about the penalty. As a 
result, the potential harm from excluding the mitigating evidence 
cannot be dismissed so easily. The mitigating evidence that the 
121 McKoy, 494 U.S. at 444. 
m ld. at 442-43. 
121 513 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1987). 
121 I d . at 661. The instruction said that *[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may 
consider, if established by the evidence, are these .... " ld. at 661 n.4. The list that followed 
only included the statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstances. 
tJO ld. at 663. 
111 I d. at 662. 
132 ld. at 662-63. 
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court perceived as unimportant might have affected the value 
judgment, based upon a sense of fairness or mercy rather than 
merely logical reasoning, of typical jurors. Each juror was entitled 
to value and weigh the mitigating factors presented in any fashion 
that the juror might choose. 133 Thus, the Florida court ignored 
the variability that is built into the penalty phase decision process 
in its analysis of the effect of the instruction. tM 
The effect of the variability in the penalty phase decision on the 
use of the harmless error doctrine cannot be underestimated. A 
harmless error analysis of evidentiary error, like instructional 
error, is affected by its variability. Unlike the assessment whether 
a piece of evidence has affected a decision that an element of a 
crime exists, where one can be more confident of the likely use of 
the evidence, the use of evidence in the penalty phase is unpredict-
able. The following example of evidence erroneously introduced in 
both the guilt and penalty phases of a trial illustrates this point. 
Suppose that impermissible character evidence has been 
admitted in the guilt phase of a trial for first degree murder in a 
beating death. A witness testified that, one month before the crime 
in question, the defendant beat another victim unceasingly with a 
lead pipe until others intervened. The evidence is inadmissible for 
the purpose of drawing a character inference. 136 If the evidence 
is erroneously admitted, we can assume that, if the jurors consid-
ered the testimony credible, they would use the evidence for any 
relevant purpose. The relevant purpose here would be to infer that, 
if the defendant brutally beat someone with a lead pipe, he is a 
violent person; if he is a violent person, it is more likely that he 
133 The same reasoning underlies the United States Supreme Court's reversal in McKoy 
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). See supra text accompanying notes 125-127 (noting 
concern about failure to recognize that individual jurors may consider and weigh mitigating 
factors in varying ways during the penalty phase). 
J.U The Supreme Court has held that a state appellate court can constitutionally conduct 
its own "reweighing" of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 
U.S. 738, 750 (1990). However, a court like the Florida court in Delap is not conducting an 
appellate reweighing. The court instead is finding no reversible error in the proceedings of 
the lower court. The review of proceedings in the lower court mandates that the appellate 
court must consider what jurors would do with the evidence. 
116 For example, FED. R. EVID. 404(a) would prohibit an inference from the prior beating 
that the defendant was violent and therefore acted in conformity with that character trait 
on the occasion of the crime charged. 
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killed or intended to kill the victim in this case. 136 Although the 
individual jurors will assess the strength of the evidence in drawing 
inferences from it, the use of the evidence is predictable based upon 
the jury's job of deciding whether the elements of the crime exist. 
In contrast, suppose that the same impermissible character 
evidence is admitted in the penalty phase of a trial. How will the 
jurors use the evidence of violence? In establishing an aggravating 
circumstance, or refuting a mitigating circumstance, the jurors will 
use the testimony of the prior beating in essentially the same way 
as in the guilt phase. The evidence is predictably relevant to the 
existence of certain facts. 137 However, the predictability fades 
when the jurors are asked to weigh the aggravating and mitigating 
factors. One juror might view the prior beating in coJ:\junction with 
the present murder charge as an overwhelming indication that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. 
Another juror might view the prior beating as too far in the past to 
have any bearing on the decision. Yet another juror might view the 
prior beating as further evidence that the defendant suffered a 
deprived youth. Thus, the impact of the testimony of the prior 
beating on the more amorphous value judgment of whether the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances 
is much less certain than the impact of similar evidence in a guilt 
determination. 
Moreover, the concern that the harmless error doctrine results in 
the appellate court usurping the jurors' role138 is exacerbated in 
the penalty phase. When applying the harmless error doctrine to 
a typical criminal trial, or to the guilt phase of a capital case, the 
appellate court is assessing how typical or reasonable jurors used 
1
• The jurors might also use the prior beating as evidence that the defendant is violent 
and deserve• to be puniehed for the prior beating. Thie would not be a permiuible use of 
the evidence and there would probably be a limiting instruction to that effect. Once again, 
however, this is a predictable use of the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial. 
m Although the use is basically predictable in terms of relevancy, it still may remain 
difficult to gauge whether such evidence •contributed• to the verdict in either the penalty 
phase or the guilt phase of the trial. 
1311 8« eupro notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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the evidence at trial in finding particular facts. 139 In order to find 
the error harmless, the appellate court must conclude that, given 
all the evidence presented against the defendant, the erroneously 
admitted evidence did not contribute to the verdict. The appellate 
court accomplishes this task by assessing the reaction of reasonable 
jurors to the evidence. For example, suppose that evidence of drugs 
found in the kitchen of the defendant's girlfriend was erroneously 
admitted at defendant's trial for possession with intent to distribute 
a controlled substance. Also suppose there is evidence that 
defendant himself had drugs at his house, in his car, and on his 
person; that he possessed weighing and packaging paraphernalia; 
and that there was a tape recording of a transaction where 
defendant accepted money for drugs. An appellate court might 
conclude that no reasonable jury would have considered the drugs 
in the girlfriend's kitchen, even though marginally relevant, in 
finding the facts to be true that defendant possessed drugs and that 
defendant had an intent to distribute. The appellate court is not 
redeciding the case; it is judging the probability that evidence was 
used for a particular purpose. 140 
1
• The Court has emphasized that the appellate court is not to look at the impact of the 
constitutional error in a vacuum, but rather to look at ita impact in the context of the actual 
case tried. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993). In SuUivan, the Court held 
that *the question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the 
constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather 
what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. • /d. (diac:ussing Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). By rejecting the approach oflooking at the effect of the error 
on a "reasonable jury; the Court was speaking of the effect of the error alone. In aaae88ing 
the effect of the constitutional error in ~e case at hand; the Court had to neceaaarily 
888ume that the jurors in the case at hand were reasonable or typical jurors. We do not 
document how individual jurors reasoned in a particular case. Consequently, appellate 
review is po88ible only by a88uming how a reasonable juror would have responded to the 
evidence. The Court has recognized that it must a88ume the jurors in the case at hand were 
reasonable. See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26 (noting the reaction of~onest, fair-minded 
jurors•). Similarly, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1965), the Court referred to 
the effect of the unconstitutionally admitted evidence •on the minds of an average jury. • /d. 
at 254. Consequently, while this Article 888umes that appellate review would focus on the 
reactions of jurors to the evidence in the case and not just the constitutional error in a 
vacuum, it also assumes that the appellate court must presume reasonable or typical 
reactions by those jurors. 
140 The concern that a harmle88 error analysis usurps the jury's role is, in part, due to the 
nature of the inquiry. If the court is focusing on the correctneaa of the actual verdict in the 
case, the court is more likely to be in the position of appellate factfinder. See Goldberg, 
supra note 7, at 429; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 5, at 126-38 (criticizing approach 
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In the penalty phase, however, the appellate court would have to 
be able to conclude that erroneously admitted evidence did not 
enter into the individual value judgments of typical, reasonable 
jurors. The decision involves more intuition into judgment calls 
than assessing the probability of how evidence was used to find 
facts. 141 Assume, for example, that evidence of defendant's prior 
involvement with drugs was erroneously admitted in the penalty 
phase. The appellate court is in the position of assessing, not the 
probability that the evidence was pertinent to a fact, but instead 
how jurors would react to the evidence. The appellate court's task 
is particularly complicated because the jurors are almost unguided 
in how they may use the evidence. The jurors may disregard it, 
count it as a major factor, or consider it a minor mitigator.142 
The appellate court cannot assume that there is a uniform response 
to the evidence, unlike in the guilt phase where the use of the 
evidence is more defined. Because it is difficult to analyze the error 
from the usual angle of the typical jury, the appellate court is more 
likely to be in fact reweighing the factors as they view them, which 
usurps the trial jury's function.143 
The conceptual basis for routinely using the harmless error 
doctrine in the penalty phase thus rests on a crumbling foundation. 
The foundational block for the harmless error doctrine, that it is 
possible to determine the effect of the error on the verdict, is 
eroded. Applying the harmless error doctrine in a situation where 
the rationale does not fit will lead to unsupported results. The 
harmless error doctrine is only beneficial if there is confidence in 
of assessing actual jury's likely verdict and approach of assessing hypothetical jury's likely 
verdict, and suggesting a standard of whether the error would affect "a reasonable jury 
drawing all inferences in a defendant's favor" rather than a focus on the likely outcome). 
w See Scoville, supra note 111, at 755 (noting that appellate court is put in the position 
of guessing what a " 'merciful' juror" would have done instead of the usual " 'reasonable' 
juror"). 
142 See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (discussing use of mitigating factors 
by individual jurors). 
ua The appellate court can constitutionally reweigh the aggravating and mitigating 
factors. See, e.g., Clemons v. Missisaippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748-50 (1990). This is not true of the 
appellate review of a typical trial where such factfinding is not permisaible. However, to the 
extent that the court is applying the harmless error doctrine in the review of the penalty 
phase, and not engaging in appellate reweighing, the appellate court should not be usurping 
the factfinder's function. 
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the reliability of the verdict. 144 That confidence will be lacking in 
penalty phase verdicts if the harmless error doctrine is routinely 
applied. In particular, the primary reasoning underlying the 
classification of errors as "structural" -that the systemic effect of 
the error makes it difficult to assess the impact of the error-leads 
to the conclusion that no error in the penalty phase should be 
subjected to a harmless error analysis. 146 
Although the rationale for utilizing a harmless error analysis 
would reject its application to penalty phase errors, the Supreme 
Court has already approved the use of a harmless error analysis in 
the penalty phase in two cases.148 The Court appears wedded to 
basing the applicability of the harmless error analysis on the 
labeling of an error as "structural" or "trial." Consequently, it is 
unlikely that an argument, as advanced above, that the reasoning 
behind the doctrine logically leads to a conclusion that the effect of 
even a trial error in the penalty phase cannot be satisfactorily 
assessed, will prevail. However, even assuming that the use of the 
harmless error doctrine in the penalty phase is defensible, courts 
tend to apply the doctrine in a perfunctory fashion. At a minimum, 
courts should begin to acknowledge the different nature of the 
decision in the penalty phase in an assessment of harmless error. 
Arguments based on the difficulty of assessing the effect of error in 
the penalty phase should be recognized. The labels of "structural" 
and "trial" error must not be rigidly applied to the exclusion of the 
reasoning behind the Chapman doctrine. The final subsection 
addresses how courts should approach an assessment of harmless 
error in the penalty phase consistent with Chapman. 
144 The reliability of a verdict of death is a consistent theme in the Supreme Court cases. 
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (noting that because there 
is a "qualitative difference• between death and a tenn of imprisonment, ~ere is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the detennination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case•); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) 
(recognizing need for "a greater degree of reliabilit~ when the death sentence is imposed); 
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988) ("Evolving standards of societal decency have 
imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the detennination that death 
is the appropriate penalty in a particular case. •); ,_ aZ.O WHITE, •upra note 103, at 8 
(discussing Supreme Court decisions establishing special guidelines to be Wled for the 
purpose of enhancing "reliability in capital sentencing-). 
146 Scoville, •upra note 111, at 755-56. 
146 See •upra text accompanying notes 38-49 (discuBBing Satterwhite and ClemoM ). 
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C. APPLICATION OF HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE PENALTY 
PHASE 
Despite the logical difficulty in assessing whether an error has 
contributed to the value-based decision in the penalty phase of 
capital cases as discussed in the preceding subsection, this 
subsection assumes that courts will continue to apply the harmless 
error doctrine to penalty phase errors. State courts now routinely 
apply a harmless error analysis to penalty phase error.147 There 
is a danger being realized in state court decisions that the unique 
nature of the value judgment being made in the penalty phase will 
not be factored into the assessment of the harm of a constitutional 
error. It is crucial to educate the courts to the importance of 
recognizing that a value judgment, and not a factfinding mission, 
is occurring in the penalty phase. This subsection proposes a more 
exacting analysis of harmless error in the penalty phase based 
upon adherence to the underlying rationale of the doctrine and 
acknowledgement of the value-based nature of the decision. 
If the courts ignore the nature of the decision in the penalty 
phase, error will be viewed as harmless without a fair assessment 
of the impact of the error. The California Supreme Court, for 
example, has treated the penalty decision as though it were a guilt 
phase decision.148 Harmless error is assessed by considering 
whether the aggravating evidence would have outweighed mitigat-
ing evidence even without the offending error. 149 For instance, in 
People v. Robertson, 150 the court found that, if the trial court 
unconstitutionally failed to consider evidence of a lack of future 
"
1 See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 756 P.2d 1348, 1360 (Cal. 1988) (holding that error in 
instruction that could have limited consideration of mitigating factors was hannle88), cerl. 
denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); Sireci v. State, 587 So. 2d 450, 454·55 (Fla. 1991) (holding error 
of admitting testimony that defendant was •proud• of murder was hannle88), cerl. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 1500 (1992); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 827-41 (N.J. 1992) (holding that errors, 
inter alia, of excluding defense psychologist's report and admitting murder scene photograph 
were harmle88); State v. Cook, 605 N.E.2d 70, 83-84 (Ohio 1992) (holding that error of 
considering prior criminal record and psychiatric report on defendant was hannless); State 
v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542, 555 (Ohio 1988) (holding that error of admitting photograph of 
defendant with a marijuana plant, which was emphasized by prosecutor in closing argument, 
was hannle88), cerl. denied, 489 U.S. 1042 (1989). 
148 People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 1109, 1128-31 (Cal.), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 879 (1980). 
148 /d. 
160 Id. 
1993] HARMLESS ERROR 159 
dangerousness, such error was harmless in light of the aggravating 
evidence. 161 
In cases such as Robertson, the courts treat the harmless error 
issue as though it were merely a matter of the amount of evidence 
supporting or not supporting a particular conclusion. The courts 
fail to acknowledge the nature of the decision the jury is making in 
weighing the evidence. Thus, in Robertson, the court should have 
considered whether, despite ample aggravating evidence, evidence 
of the lack of future dangerousness would have contributed to the 
moral judgment of the sentencer. Even in People v. Lucero, 162 
where the California Supreme Court found that the erroneous 
exclusion of psychological evidence in mitigation was not harmless 
because there was little aggravating evidence, 163 the court failed 
to recognize the nature of the decision. The Lucero court's empha-
sis was on the amount of mitigating and aggravating evidence 
rather than taking into account how the weighing decision is 
reached. 164 
Courts should approach the issue of a harmless error analysis in 
the penalty phase in stages.166 The first issue is the applicability 
of the harmless error doctrine to the type of error involved, as 
151 Id. at 651. Despite statements by the trial judge to the contrary, the California 
Supreme Court held that the judge had considered the evidence defendant presented of hia 
good acijustment to prison. ld. The trial judge, for instance, stated: 'The Court does not 
consider the fact that [the defendant] does not appear to pose a threat to society aa long as 
he's confined to prison to be a factor either in aggravation or mitigation ... . " I d. The 
California Supreme Court, covering all baaea, went on to address the hannleae error issue 
in case the trial judge did not consider the mitigating evidence. Id. at 653. In the course of 
its harmleae error diacuaeion, the California court reviewed the aggravating evidence at 
length and then concluded that the "lack of future dangerousness could not have affected its 
penalty determination." Id. 
161 750 P.2d 1342 (Cal. 1988). 
161 Id. at 1353-57. 
154 Id. In Lucero, the prosecution called only one witneae in the penalty phase. ld. at 
1353. They called an expert, who testified to the flaws in psychological opinions, to refute 
the defendant's psychological evidence of impairment. Id. The defendant presented 
mitigating evidence of lack of criminal history, problem childhood, "traumatic military 
experience," and mental illneae. I d . at 1352. · 
155 The fact that there are two stages is simply a restatement of the law aa understood 
from Chapman. The stages are first, whether the harmleae error doctrine is applicable and 
second, if applicable, whether the error was harmleae. These are the same stages identified 
from Chapman and its progeny for all criminal cases. 8ft LAFAVE 8t ISRAEL, supra note 53, 
§ 27.6, at 1167. However, the analysis of the iaeues in each stage must be tailored to the 
nature of the penalty phase decision. 
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discussed in the previous subsection. Rather than assuming that 
the harmless error doctrine will apply because the type of error is 
one where the doctrine would apply in the guilt phase, courts 
should independently assess the propriety of using harmless error 
analysis in the penalty phase. Thus, a court should ask whether 
the effect of the error is determinable in the context of the penalty 
phase, remembering the value judgment being made by the jurors 
in the penalty phase. 
Second, if the court finds that the harmless error analysis is 
applicable, the court next must decide if, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the error did not contribute to the penalty verdict. The 
penalty verdict is the decision that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 1156 This analysis calls 
for a clear differentiation of the nature of the decision in the 
penalty phase from the nature of the decision in the guilt phase. 
Courts should be focused on the effect of the error on the subjective 
value-based decision of the jurors in balancing aggravating and 
mitigating factors in contrast to the more objective, factual decision 
in the guilt phase. 
As an example of the process courts should follow, consider the 
following penalty phase scenario. Suppose that the trial court 
refused to permit the defendant's mother to testify in the penalty 
phase. She would have testified to physical abuse of defendant as 
a child. However, the court did permit a psychologist to testify for 
the defense. The psychologist testified to defendant's abused 
childhood. based on her interviews with the defendant, his family, 
and psychological testing, and also testified to the effects of that 
abuse. Other mitigating evidence included defendant's alcohol 
addiction and his remorse for the crime. Aggravating evidence 
included the nature of the murder and the defendant's prior 
convictions for robbery and manslaughter. The statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance proved was a murder in the course of a rob-
lN The court would also have a subsidiary issue of the harmlessness of the error to the 
decision of the existence of an aggravating or mitigating factor. This analysis would be much 
more parallel to the guilt phase analysis of harmless error. Regardless of the analysis of the 
harmlessness of the error for this decision, however, the court would ultimately have to 
assess the harmlessness of the error with regard to the balancing decision diacuaaed in the 
text. 
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bery.157 The victim was killed in the course of a robbery that 
resulted in holding hostages for twenty-four hours. The penalty 
phase jury sentenced defendant to death in a "weighing" jurisdic-
tion.158 On appeal, the court has found constitutional error in the 
refusal to admit the mother's testimony.159 The remaining issue 
is whether the error was harmless. 
The question for the appellate court in the first stage is whether 
the harmless error doctrine is applicable to the type of error found. 
This question revisits the conceptual issue, addressed in the 
previous subsection, that is largely ignored in the categorization of 
errors as "structliral" or "trial. "160 If one uses the structural-trial 
dichotomy, the evidentiary error of excluding the mother's testimo-
ny would undoubtedly be labeled a trial error. Without regard to 
the nature of the decision, the mother's testimony would simply be 
viewed as comparable to the confession in Fulminante/61 or the 
psychological testimony in Satterwhite. 162 As trial error, the 
harmless error doctrine would be applicable. 
A more conceptually honest approach would ask whether, given 
the nature of the decisions in the penalty phase, it is possible, and 
therefore practicable, to determine the effect of the error. Because 
the "weighing" decision is so individual to each juror and reflects a 
value judgment, it is difficult to assess the "contribution" of any 
error.163 A court should ask whether it is conceivable to assess 
the effect of the exclusion of the mitigating testimony of the mother 
on the critical decisions in the penalty phase. The applicability of 
157 See supra note 94 (examining statutory aggravating factors, such as a murder in the 
course of a robbery). 
1118 See supra note 100 (showing typical weighing statutes). 
1118 The defendant has a constitutional right to have the sentencer consider statutory and 
nonstatutory mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (holding 
as error the lower court's refusal to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence, including past 
inhalation of car fumes, coming from a poor family, and being an Maffectionate uncle•). 
180 See supra notes 119-145 and accompanying text (discussing the structural-trial error 
dichotomy). 
111 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing error analysis in Fulmin· 
ante). 
112 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing Satterwhite). 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 136-137 (discussing jury's inferences from 
evidence). Even the contribution of the error to the preliminary decision by the jurors of 
whether a mitigating circumstance exists poses problems because each juror may define 
individually what a mitigating circumstance is and whether it exists. 
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the harmless error doctrine should not be a foregone conclusion. 
In this scenario, it would be quite difficult to assess the effect of 
the mother's testimony. Some jurors might consider the mother's 
testimony highly significant to the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, as the words of the mother might carry greater 
weight than those of a dispassionate psychologist. Other jurors 
might view the mother as biased, adding little to the psychologist's 
summary. The mother's testimony is an example of the phenome-
non, discussed in the previous subsection, of a typical trial error 
that should be treated as a per se reversible, structural error in the 
penalty phase on the basis of the rationale of the harmless error 
doctrine. Because of the reliance on the structural-trial labels in 
lieu of the rationale behind them, however, many courts would 
quickly label the mother's testimony as trial error. The Supreme 
Court similarly failed to recognize the different nature of the 
penalty phase when it applied the harmless error doctrine to the 
psychologist's testimony in Satterwhite. 164 Consequently, with 
the Supreme Court's own failure to focus adequately on the 
different nature of the penalty phase, it is clear that the primary 
issue for litigation will not be whether the harmless error doctrine 
is applicable to types of errors, but rather whether individual errors 
are harmless. 
The second stage of analysis is the application of the harmless 
error standard to the error in the case. The jurors are to decide if 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. 
Applying the Chapman standard, courts should ask whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the excluded evidence would have 
contributed to that decision. 
It is complicated to assess the harm resulting from an error 
affecting the weighing decision. 166 The appellate- court is now in 
1
" See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discu88ing Satterwhite). 
186 There is also a preliminary decision made by the sentencer whether aggravating and 
mitigating circumatances exist. The decision whether a mitigating circumstance exists, 
although similar on the surface to the guilt phase decision, involves more variability. 
Neverthele88, an appellate court could pose the question, comparable to a guilt phase error, 
whether there is a likelihood that the excluded testimony of the mother would have 
contributed to a decision that a mitigating factor of an abua.ed childhood existed. Here, the 
court would have to consider the nature of the evidence, the strength in the mother's 
knowledge, and the wealtne1111 in the obvious bias of the mother. The court would also have 
to consider the other evidence on point-the psychologist's testimony about the abused 
1993] HARMLESS ERROR 163 
the position of guessing how reasonable jurors would make a value 
judgment, instead of a fact-based decision. The court must assume 
a reasonable judgmental juror.166 In fact-based decisions, the 
court is able to assume a logical progression in reasoning from fact 
to conclusion. But the weighing decision calls for an assumption of 
the personal feelings of "reasonable" jurors towards the evi-
dence. 167 The Supreme Court has referred to the penalty phase 
decision as a " 'reasoned moral response.' "168 
In the hypothetical scenario concerning the mother's testimony 
about the defendant's abused background, the appellate court must 
ask: Is there a reasonable possibility that the lack of the mother's 
testimony contributed to the jurors' reasoned moral or judgmental 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances? This 
question is significantly more multifaceted than assessing the 
contribution of evidence to whether a mitigating circumstance or an 
element of a crime exists. The court must take into account the 
emotions, as well as the logical reasoning, of the "reasonable" juror. 
Thus, in our scenario, the court must assess the likely reaction 
of jurors to the defendant's own mother acknowledging physical 
background. Would reasonable juron have recognized the mitigating circumstance of an 
abused background with just the psychologist's testimony such that the mother's testimony 
would not have mattered? Would reasonable juron have rejected the mitigating circum-
stance on the basis of just the psychologist's testimony and would the mother's testimony, 
therefore, have contributed to a different decision? It is a more difficult asseument than 
that made in a typical guilt phase because each juror may, in essence, decide what 
constitutes a mitigating circumstance as well as whether the evidence supports a finding of 
that mitigating circumstance. 
111 See Scoville, •upra note 111, at 755 (referring to •merciful• juron as the standard, but 
contrasting the merciful juron with •reasonable" juron). The author is correct that the 
juron are permitted to include •mercy" in their decision because they are being asked a 
virtually unguided value judgment. On the other hand, an appellate court must assume an 
average, typical, or reasonable •merciful" juror in reviewing how the evidence or instructions 
were likely to be used. Otherwise, the appellate court is in a position of either aecond 
guening particular juron in a case or speculating on an infinite variety of reactions. This 
Article agrees that the appellate court must assume an average, typical, or reasonable juror, 
but it must aseume an average, typical, or reasonable juror who is making a value-based 
decision. 
1
.., The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to instruct juron not to respond 
with •mere sympathy: but only because any sympathy juron feel must be a reaction to the 
evidence presented. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987). 
118 Same v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,493 (1990) (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring)). The Court, thus, recognized the combination of a value-based judgment call 
and logic by referring to the juron' task as a " 'reasoned moral response.' " Id. 
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abuse of her son as well as the jurors, likely reaction to the murder 
itself and the hostage aspect of the crime. If the court properly 
focuses on whether it can find that the erroneous exclusion of the 
mothers testimony did not contribute to the death verdict, 169 it 
seems unlikely that the court could conclude that the error was 
harmless. Although there is similar testimony from the psycholo-
gist, the nature of the evidence would probably affect reasonable 
jurors. The testimony of defendant's own mother is strong 
emotional evidence. Her mere presence on the witness stand may 
well affect jurors, views of the balance of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors. 
Even if the court focuses on whether there is overwhelming 
evidence to support the death verdict,170 it seems likely that the 
error is still not harmless. Although the defendanfs prior crimes 
and hostage-taking present substantial aggravating evidence, the 
issue is whether there is overwhelming evidence that the aggravat-
ing factors outweigh the mitigating factors. To gauge whether the 
evidence is overwhelming in the penalty phase context, the court 
would have to conclude that the jurors would not be likely to place 
significant value on the mothers testimony in conjunction with the 
other mitigating evidence. Because jurors are free to value 
mitigating evidence as they choose, 171 a court would be hard-
pressed to conclude that reasonable jurors would not place 
substantial value on a mothers testimony about her son,s back-
ground. Consequently, if the jurors had heard the mothers 
testimony, a court could not confidently find that the evidence was 
overwhelming that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors. 
The nature of the penalty phase decision-the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances-is thus critical in the 
analysis of harmless error. The harmlessness of the error is based 
on assessing how much the various pieces of evidence affect the 
1
• See 1upra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's waming on its 
interpretation of the term •contributes•). 
110 See 1upra text accompanying note 63 (discussing Court's approach of looking at 
whether there is •overwhelming- evidence to support the verdict, which usually results in 
finding the error harmless). 
171 See supra text accompany:ng notes 103-105 (discussing jurors' assessment of 
mitigating evidence). 
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jurors' intuitive feelings about the balance of aggravating and 
mitigating evidence. Although there is a logical component to the 
analysis, other intuitive or judgmental components also must be 
considered.172 
The distinct nature of the penalty phase decision necessitates a 
clearer delineation of the analysis of harmless error. It is impor-
tant to understand the reasoning of courts from both a theoretical 
and a practical view. From a theoretical viewpoint, a clear 
analytical outline will foster a coherent, principled approach to the 
harmless error doctrine, which currently is lacking. Courts should, 
in the first stage, explain why certain errors are subject to 
harmless error analysis; mere labels of "structural" and "trial" 
errors are insufficient. Courts should also, in the second stage, 
clarify their use of the "contributes" standard. From a practical 
viewpoint, lawyers will be able to understand the merits of the 
issues and form their arguments with more cohesion based upon an 
understanding of the principles supporting a harmless error 
doctrine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The harmless error doctrine conserves judicial time. Judgments 
that did not affect the verdict are not reversed for error. The 
preservation of judgments, despite harmless error, promotes the 
integrity of our criminal justice system. But there is no integrity 
in a haphazard use of the harmless error doctrine. The doctrine 
should not be used solely as a vehicle to speed resolution of cases. 
The harmless error doctrine has a place in our legal system, but 
only within the boundaries of its legal rationale. If cut loose from 
its rationale, harmless error demeans the constitutional interests 
at stake. 
The harmless error doctrine is only appropriate if the error's 
effect on the verdict is calculable. The value-based nature of the 
112 For an explanation on a theoretical level of why both a logical and an emotional 
judgment is made by the jurors in the penalty phase, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the 
Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. 
REv. 323 (1992) (explaining that penalty phase decision involves aBSessment of both the 
culpability and the just deserts of defendant, providing critique of Supreme Court cases, and 
offering insight into why the Court has trouble finding a principled approach in this area). 
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decision in the penalty phase of a capital case, weighing aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, renders it difficult, at best, to calculate 
the effect of an error. A recognition that the value-based nature of 
the decision in the penalty phase is distinct from the factfinding 
nature of the guilt or innocence decision in a typical trial is the 
first step. An important second step will be court decisions on 
penalty phase error that reflect a better understanding of the 
purpose and rationale of the harmless error doctrine. The penalty 
phase verdict requires a harmless error analysis tailored to an 
understanding of the effect of constitutional error when the decision 
reflects a value judgment. 
